jeudi, décembre 19, 2013
Le christianisme est-il responsable de tous nos maux ?
Le christianisme est-il responsable de tous nos maux, en particulier de l'immigrationnisme ? C'est la question qui suscite force commentaires sous un précédent billet.
J'avoue qu'elle ne m'intéresse pas beaucoup. Exactement comme pour l'antisémitisme, je fais un blocage : je n'ai pas envie d'y réfléchir, j'y vois une perte de temps. Ceci n'est pas un argument. Au contraire, c'est pour vous expliquer que je n'ai pas envie d'argumenter.
Les thèses occidentalistes à la de Benoist, Venner et compagnie ont toujours suscité chez moi un sourire poli, et parfois une franche hilarité. C'est plus fort que moi, je n'arrive pas à les prendre au sérieux.
J'ai pourtant bien conscience que la doctrine politico-économique de l'Eglise est depuis quelques décennies, sur des points essentiels, à la fois grotesque et dangereuse. Mais je suis persuadé que, dans ce domaine, elle suit plus qu'elle ne conduit. Ca serait au moment où elle perd toute influence en Occident que l'Eglise y ferait sentir ses effets nocifs ? Difficile à croire. Rappelons que le déclin de l'Eglise en Europe a commencé à la la fin de la Contre-Réforme. Nous nous sommes mis, en France par exemple, à avoir des évêques ouvertement athées, comme M. de Talleyrand-Périgord.
Si je devais me rallier à une thèse, ce serait celle de Chesterterton (décidément à la mode sur ce blog) : Le monde moderne est plein de vertus chrétiennes devenues folles.
Voici le passage :
The modern world is not evil; in some ways the modern world is far too good. It is full of wild and wasted virtues. When a religious scheme is shattered (as Christianity was shattered at the Reformation), it is not merely the vices that are let loose. The vices are, indeed, let loose, and they wander and do damage. But the virtues are let loose also; and the virtues wander more wildly, and the virtues do more terrible damage. The modern world is full of the old Christian virtues gone mad. The virtues have gone mad because they have been isolated from each other and are wandering alone. Thus some scientists care for truth; and their truth is pitiless. Thus some humanitarians only care for pity; and their pity (I am sorry to say) is often untruthful. For example, Mr. Blatchford attacks Christianity because he is mad on one Christian virtue: the merely mystical and almost irrational virtue of charity. He has a strange idea that he will make it easier to forgive sins by saying that there are no sins to forgive. Mr. Blatchford is not only an early Christian, he is the only early Christian who ought really to have been eaten by lions. For in his case the pagan accusation is really true: his mercy would mean mere anarchy. He really is the enemy of the human raceóbecause he is so human. As the other extreme, we may take the acrid realist, who has deliberately killed in himself all human pleasure in happy tales or in the healing of the heart. Torquemada tortured people physically for the sake of moral truth. Zola tortured people morally for the sake of physical truth. But in Torquemada's time there was at least a system that could to some extent make righteousness and peace kiss each other. Now they do not even bow. But a much stronger case than these two of truth and pity can be found in the remarkable case of the dislocation of humility.
It is only with one aspect of humility that we are here concerned. Humility was largely meant as a restraint upon the arrogance and infinity of the appetite of man. He was always out-stripping his mercies with his own newly invented needs. His very power of enjoyment destroyed half his joys. By asking for pleasure, he lost the chief pleasure; for the chief pleasure is surprise. Hence it became evident that if a man would make his world large, he must be always making himself small. Even the haughty visions, the tall cities, and the toppling pinnacles are the creations of humility. Giants that tread down forests like grass are the creations of humility. Towers that vanish upwards above the loneliest star are the creations of humility. For towers are not tall unless we look up at them; and giants are not giants unless they are larger than we. All this gigantesque imagination, which is, perhaps, the mightiest of the pleasures of man, is at bottom entirely humble. It is impossible without humility to enjoy anythingóeven pride.
But what we suffer from to-day is humility in the wrong place. Modesty has moved from the organ of ambition. Modesty has settled upon the organ of conviction; where it was never meant to be. A man was meant to be doubtful about himself, but undoubting about the truth; this has been exactly reversed. Nowadays the part of a man that a man does assert is exactly the part he ought not to assertóhimself. The part he doubts is exactly the part he ought not to doubtóthe Divine Reason. Huxley preached a humility content to learn from Nature. But the new sceptic is so humble that he doubts if he can even learn. Thus we should be wrong if we had said hastily that there is no humility typical of our time. The truth is that there is a real humility typical of our time; but it so happens that it is practically a more poisonous humility than the wildest prostrations of the ascetic. The old humility was a spur that prevented a man from stopping; not a nail in his boot that prevented him from going on. For the old humility made a man doubtful about his efforts, which might make him work harder. But the new humility makes a man doubtful about his aims, which will make him stop working altogether.
At any street corner we may meet a man who utters the frantic and blasphemous statement that he may be wrong. Every day one comes across somebody who says that of course his view may not be the right one. Of course his view must be the right one, or it is not his view. We are on the road to producing a race of men too mentally modest to believe in the multiplication table. We are in danger of seeing philosophers who doubt the law of gravity as being a mere fancy of their own. Scoffers of old time were too proud to be convinced; but these are too humble to be convinced. The meek do inherit the earth; but the modern sceptics are too meek even to claim their inheritance. It is exactly this intellectual helplessness which is our second problem.
The last chapter has been concerned only with a fact of observation: that what peril of morbidity there is for man comes rather from his reason than his imagination. It was not meant to attack the authority of reason; rather it is the ultimate purpose to defend it. For it needs defence. The whole modern world is at war with reason; and the tower already reels.
Pour résumer, c'est l'explosion du christianisme qui a balancé un peu partout de dangereux éclats sous forme d'idées, ou de vertus, devenues incohérentes parce que plus liées par une doctrine et par une foi.
Je pense que je suis en phase avec cette analyse quand je peste contre la misère intellectuelle de l'Eglise. Pour le dire brutalement, bien des propos politico-économiques des dignitaires de l'Eglise, en France ou au Vatican, sont ahurissants de niaiserie.