Le fisc français est plus efficace que le fisc grec, ce qui fait que nous nous dirigeons vers la cessation de paiement avec un taux d'imposition beaucoup plus élevé que les Grecs, et donc avec beaucoup moins de marges de manœuvre coté recettes, mais, à part ce point, nos situations sont remarquablement parallèles, à deux ans d'écart.
En 2008, en Grèce, il y avait des manifestations contre les réformes, les jeunes étaient dans la rue, les syndicats et l'opposition expliquaient qu'il ne fallait pas se soumettre, que tout pouvait continuer comme avant.
Puis, les manifestations sont devenues de plus en plus violentes, tournant à l'émeute.
Il a fallu trois morts dont une femme enceinte pour que les Grecs se résignent et préfèrent la réforme à la chienlit.
J'espère qu'en France il n'y aura pas de morts, mais hélas, les idées fausses sont si fortement ancrées que je crains que nous ne devions attendre le brutal rappel à la réalité que constituent des morts bien réels dans ce monde-ci, pour faire éclater la bulle des fantasmes d'«un autre monde est possible» (1).
Les jeunes, les vieux, les riches
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(1) : d'autant que je suis estomaqué de constater à quel point des médias dits sérieux jouent les pyromanes.
Affichage des articles dont le libellé est kleptocratie française. Afficher tous les articles
Affichage des articles dont le libellé est kleptocratie française. Afficher tous les articles
samedi, octobre 16, 2010
samedi, octobre 09, 2010
L'Etat est mort, vive l'état (C. Gave)
Ayant déjà rendu compte de la conférence de Charles Gave sur le même sujet, Je n'ai pas grand'chose à ajouter.
Charles Gave précise que le niveau de dépense publique qui lui paraît idéal se situe autour de 30 % du PIB, c'est-à-dire celui que l'on obtiendrait en privatisant de manière substantielle les assurances sociales, l'école, les transports collectifs et l'énergie.
Malgré tout, la France a une chance insigne : les entrepreneurs qui ont réussi à survivre malgré notre Etat en sont devenus les meilleurs du monde, suivant le bon vieil adage «tout ce qui ne tue pas endurcit». Ce que les anglo-saxons traduisent par cette demi-boutade : «Heureusement, nous avons l'Etat français pour retenir nos concurrents français». N'oubliez pas qu'Archos a anticipé iPod, l'IPhone et l'iPad ! Que feraient ces petites sociétés françaises si il leur était soudain permis d'accumuler assez de profits pour attirer les investisseurs et financer leur développement ? C'est simple : nous obtiendrions les nouveaux Air Liquide, Renault, Michelin, Dassault ...
Charles Gave précise que le niveau de dépense publique qui lui paraît idéal se situe autour de 30 % du PIB, c'est-à-dire celui que l'on obtiendrait en privatisant de manière substantielle les assurances sociales, l'école, les transports collectifs et l'énergie.
Malgré tout, la France a une chance insigne : les entrepreneurs qui ont réussi à survivre malgré notre Etat en sont devenus les meilleurs du monde, suivant le bon vieil adage «tout ce qui ne tue pas endurcit». Ce que les anglo-saxons traduisent par cette demi-boutade : «Heureusement, nous avons l'Etat français pour retenir nos concurrents français». N'oubliez pas qu'Archos a anticipé iPod, l'IPhone et l'iPad ! Que feraient ces petites sociétés françaises si il leur était soudain permis d'accumuler assez de profits pour attirer les investisseurs et financer leur développement ? C'est simple : nous obtiendrions les nouveaux Air Liquide, Renault, Michelin, Dassault ...
samedi, avril 03, 2010
Ca n'est pas mieux ailleurs, mais ça ne console pas
Theodore Dalrymple
The Fix Is In
Why Britain’s National Health Service spends so much and does so little
22 March 2010
Americans would do well to ponder a recent admission by a former British minister in the Blair government. On March 2, the Guardian reported that the ex-minister, now Lord Warner, said that while spending on Britain’s National Health Service had increased by 60 percent under the Labour government, its output had decreased by 4 percent. No doubt the spending of a Soviet-style organization like the NHS is more easily measurable than its output, but the former minister’s remark certainly accords with the experiences of many citizens, who see no dramatic improvement in the service as a result of such vastly increased outlays. On the contrary, while the service has taken on 400,000 new staff members—that is to say, one-fifth of all new jobs created in Britain during the period—continuity of medical care has been all but extinguished. Nobody now expects to see the same doctor on successive occasions, in the hospital or anywhere else.
The ex-minister admitted that most of the extra money—which by now must equal a decent proportion of the total national debt—had been simply wasted. (The same might be said, of course, of the increased outlays put toward state education.) But his explanation for this state of affairs was superficial and self-exculpating, to say the least: he said that the NHS received more money than it knew what to do with because of managerial inexperience. “It was like giving a starving man foie gras and caviar,” he said.
As it happens, the NHS knew exactly what to do with the money: give it to its staff, new and old. British doctors, for example, are now the second-highest-paid in the world, though not necessarily the happiest. They have accepted the money on condition that they also accept—as quietly as mice—increasing government interference in their work. When you go to a family doctor in Britain, he is more likely to do what the government thinks he ought to do and will pay him a bonus for doing than what he thinks is right. This is sinister, even when what the government thinks is right happens to be right.
There is a possible explanation other than managerial inexperience for the waste, namely that the waste was intended and desired: indeed, that it was the principal object of the spending. Experience has long shown that further spending by state-monopoly suppliers of services (if services is quite the word I seek) benefits not the consumers but the providers. And they—ever more numerous—naturally vote for their own providers, the politicians. Thus the NHS has become an enormously expensive method of ballot-stuffing. Personally, I would rather have outright electoral fraud. It would be less expensive and slightly more honest.
Just before the last election, the chief executive of one of the hospitals in which I once worked was overheard saying, “My job is to make sure that the government is reelected.” (The government’s job, in turn, was to make sure that she remained chief executive.) She also explained that the hospital could expect no increase in its government funding, unlike other hospitals—because it was located in an area in which most people voted for the government anyway.
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Theodore Dalrymple, a physician, is a contributing editor of City Journal and the Dietrich Weismann Fellow at the Manhattan Institute. His most recent book is The New Vichy Syndrome.
The Fix Is In
Why Britain’s National Health Service spends so much and does so little
22 March 2010
Americans would do well to ponder a recent admission by a former British minister in the Blair government. On March 2, the Guardian reported that the ex-minister, now Lord Warner, said that while spending on Britain’s National Health Service had increased by 60 percent under the Labour government, its output had decreased by 4 percent. No doubt the spending of a Soviet-style organization like the NHS is more easily measurable than its output, but the former minister’s remark certainly accords with the experiences of many citizens, who see no dramatic improvement in the service as a result of such vastly increased outlays. On the contrary, while the service has taken on 400,000 new staff members—that is to say, one-fifth of all new jobs created in Britain during the period—continuity of medical care has been all but extinguished. Nobody now expects to see the same doctor on successive occasions, in the hospital or anywhere else.
The ex-minister admitted that most of the extra money—which by now must equal a decent proportion of the total national debt—had been simply wasted. (The same might be said, of course, of the increased outlays put toward state education.) But his explanation for this state of affairs was superficial and self-exculpating, to say the least: he said that the NHS received more money than it knew what to do with because of managerial inexperience. “It was like giving a starving man foie gras and caviar,” he said.
As it happens, the NHS knew exactly what to do with the money: give it to its staff, new and old. British doctors, for example, are now the second-highest-paid in the world, though not necessarily the happiest. They have accepted the money on condition that they also accept—as quietly as mice—increasing government interference in their work. When you go to a family doctor in Britain, he is more likely to do what the government thinks he ought to do and will pay him a bonus for doing than what he thinks is right. This is sinister, even when what the government thinks is right happens to be right.
There is a possible explanation other than managerial inexperience for the waste, namely that the waste was intended and desired: indeed, that it was the principal object of the spending. Experience has long shown that further spending by state-monopoly suppliers of services (if services is quite the word I seek) benefits not the consumers but the providers. And they—ever more numerous—naturally vote for their own providers, the politicians. Thus the NHS has become an enormously expensive method of ballot-stuffing. Personally, I would rather have outright electoral fraud. It would be less expensive and slightly more honest.
Just before the last election, the chief executive of one of the hospitals in which I once worked was overheard saying, “My job is to make sure that the government is reelected.” (The government’s job, in turn, was to make sure that she remained chief executive.) She also explained that the hospital could expect no increase in its government funding, unlike other hospitals—because it was located in an area in which most people voted for the government anyway.
****************
Theodore Dalrymple, a physician, is a contributing editor of City Journal and the Dietrich Weismann Fellow at the Manhattan Institute. His most recent book is The New Vichy Syndrome.
jeudi, avril 01, 2010
Le bouclier fiscal protège les pauvres
La politique est quelquefois subtile.
Le bouclier fiscal protège les pauvres des augmentations d'impots directs.
En effet, si les taux d'imposition directe augmentaient, les riches en seraient exonérés par le bouclier fiscal, ce qui est, bien évidemment, politiquement suicidaire. Donc, tant que le bouclier fiscal existe, aucun gouvernement ne peut augmenter les impots directs.
Le bouclier fiscal protège les pauvres des augmentations d'impots directs.
En effet, si les taux d'imposition directe augmentaient, les riches en seraient exonérés par le bouclier fiscal, ce qui est, bien évidemment, politiquement suicidaire. Donc, tant que le bouclier fiscal existe, aucun gouvernement ne peut augmenter les impots directs.
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